Youth Bulge, Violent Crime, and Shortages in the Israeli Arab Marriage Market

There is broad consensus in the literature regarding the positive correlation between, on the one hand, a large cohort of socially disengaged youth, as reflected in high rates of unemployment, underemployment, and non-participation in higher education and other institutions (e.g., the army, national service), and on the other hand, high rates of crime and other socially deviant behavior. This study examines this situation in Israeli society. The study points to a relationship between the youth bulge – as these large cohorts are sometimes called – and increasing rates of crime in Arab society, and also to how gender differences in educational attainment among young Arabs will modify gender relations and the structure of marriage and family in Arab society over the coming years.

Part of the motivation for conducting this study is to explain the sharp rise in the number of murders in the Arab sector.  It has doubled since 2015, as murders in the Jewish sector have fallen. As a result, 80% of all murders in Israel between 2020 and 2021 were in the Arab sector, up from 40% in 2011.

The youth bulge and the increase in the murder rate

The Arab population in Israel has a relatively young age profile. There are more individuals aged 0–10 than those aged 20–30 and many more individuals aged 20–30 than those aged 40–50. Nonetheless, a closer examination of the age profile shows a bulge between the late teens and the mid-20s. In fact, Arab men and women account for a higher percentage of 18–22 year olds than of any other age group: 29%, as compared to 8% in the 70+ age group, 23% in the under-5 age group, and 21% overall.

A look at the relationship between the rate of growth in the number of Arab men aged 18–22 and both the murder rate and self-reported feelings of a lack of security shows a positive and statistically significant correlation.

As the number of young Arab men reaching labor market age has grown, their employment rates have fallen: there was a 7 percentage point drop in the rate of employment among Arab men aged 15–24 and 25–34 during the two years prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, due the mismatch between their skills and the needs of the labor market. From the viewpoint of education and the chances of success in the labor market, the share of Arab men in their 30s with an academic degree has increased during the past 20 years and today stands at 18%. This is higher than the share among Haredi (ultra-Orthodox Jewish) men (11%), although it is still substantially lower than the share among non-Haredi Jewish men (47%) and is only about one-half of the rate among young Arab women (35%). The near future does not look much brighter in terms of education and labor market prospects given the low scores of young Arab men on the PISA test and the bagrut (matriculation) exams: they are significantly lower than those of Jews, and now also lower than those of Arab women.

The low average levels of education among young Arab men, together with their sheer numbers, is one of the factors driving the rise in crime in contemporary Arab society in Israel.

Changing gender attitudes

Another factor which will likely contribute to the high rate of crime among young men in Arab society over the coming years involves the emerging trends in the Arab marriage market. The average age difference between a bride and groom in Israeli Arab society is six years. Since cohorts below age 18 are smaller than those aged 18-22, this means that starting from around 2026 the number of men at the normative age for marriage will be about 5–10% greater than the number of Arab women at the normative age for marriage. This ratio does not even take into account the phenomenon of polygyny in Arab society, found primarily among the Bedouin population, which itself reduces the number of women available for marriage to never-married men.

At the same time, changes in education are increasingly favoring women in Arab society. On the assumption that the increase in levels of education will encourage Arab women to enter the labor market, it can be expected that they will become more independent financially and will have greater freedom in their choice of whether and when to marry and how to live their lives in general. The first signs of these changes can already be seen: in the rising age of marriage, the growing number of young Arab couples living in newly mixed-cities, such as Nof HaGalil, Carmiel, Arad, and Beer Sheva, and even in the increasing rates of divorce. Between 2004 and 2019, the divorce rate per 1,000 population grew by more than 50% among Muslims and Druze and even more among Christians. Another outcome of change — though still marginal — can be seen in the number of Arab women, most of whom are educated Christians, who choose to marry non-Arab Israelis.

Overall, this combination of a demographic imbalance in the size of cohorts and the increasing educational advantage of women will contribute to growing rates of singlehood. A substantial number of young Arab men who want to marry will not be able to find a wife, which will likely further deepen levels of social disengagement.

During the next 10 to 15 years, the age groups reaching adulthood in the Arab population will be smaller — in absolute numbers — than the current group of young adults. During this time period, efforts should be made to improve educational achievements and skills, particularly among young Arab men, and to ensure their social and economic engagement, including through some type of post high-school framework such as national service. Similarly, a window of opportunity will exist for political leaders — and first and foremost local leaders in the Arab communities — in which to prepare young men for a less patriarchal society, in which an increasing share of women are educated, participate in the labor market, and are more independent than previous generations.