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The events of the past two years have had a significant impact on Israel’s demography — affecting, among other things, fertility rates, which initially declined at the start of the war but surged again after a few months; emigration, which began showing early signs of growth; and the disparities in population growth between the North and the South. The head of the Taub Center’s Demography Program, Prof. Alex Weinreb, provides an in-depth review of demographic trends in Israel in 2024, including the shifts in fertility associated with the proposed judicial reform and the war, as well as the challenges Israel is expected to face.
Very high fertility rates among the Jewish population
The Total Fertility Rate in Israel — the number of children a woman is expected to have in her lifetime given current age-specific fertility rates — declined from about 3.10 between 2015 and 2018 to 2.84 in 2023. However, in the first five months of 2024, fertility rates shifted direction. Rather than continuing to decline, they returned to 2022 levels and even slightly surpassed them.
An analysis of these trends by population group and religion reveals that this new national trend was driven by a divergence in the fertility patterns of Jewish women alone. From January to May 2024, the fertility rate among Jewish women climbed back to 3.10 children per woman. In contrast, among all other religious groups, the downward trend in fertility continued during these months, reaching 2.68, 1.62, 1.64, and 1.24 children per woman for Muslim, Christian, Druze, and “Other” (without religious classification) women, respectively.
Birth data from June–July 2024—reflecting conceptions in October and November 2023—show that the war initially had a negative impact on fertility rates across all populations. However, the sharpest declines were observed among the Jewish, Christian, and Other populations compared to fertility rates in the first five months of the year. Among the Jewish population, this drop likely reflects the mass call-up for reserve duty in October and November 2023.
Starting in August, fertility rates began to rise again. This occurred across all population groups, but once again the largest increase — by a significant margin — was among Jewish women, whose fertility rate rose to 3.19 children per woman.
These fertility patterns highlight the uniqueness of fertility in Israel from an international perspective, confirming that Jews now constitute the population group with the highest fertility rate in the country.
Alongside reports of Israelis considering leaving the country — a significant increase in immigration to Israel
In recent years, a large number of immigrants have arrived in Israel, and during the first nine months of 2024, immigration levels remained relatively high despite the ongoing war. While immigration levels declined somewhat in October and November 2023, the prolonged war did not reduce the immigration rate below the average seen in the period before the Covid-19 pandemic. On the contrary, between January and August 2024, 23,150 immigrants arrived in Israel — more than during the same period in any given year from 2012 to 2021, except 2019. However, immigration levels did not reach the heights some had predicted in light of the rise in antisemitism in various parts of the world.
The study shows a significant increase in the number of immigrants from the United States (29.7%), Canada (32.8%), and European countries that were not part of the former Soviet Union (63.2%). Immigration from France, which in the past accounted for a large share of immigrants from Western Europe, jumped by 92.2%.
Regarding immigration and emigration, the net number of entries and exits of Israelis generally determines whether migration in a given year is positive or negative. In October and November 2023, the number of returning Israelis was exceptionally high compared to any other year, but this trend did not persist. The first five months of 2024 closely resembled previous years (excluding 2020). Unusual migration patterns only began to appear in June and July, during which the net number of Israelis exiting the country — exits minus entries — reached 251,000 people. In no year since 2012 has this figure exceeded 190,000 during those months.
According to the study’s author, it is not yet possible to interpret these data. The large number of exits in 2024 may at least partially be “compensation” for the high number of entries in 2023. Alternatively, it may reflect the departure of some of the 102,000 new Israeli immigrants from Russia or Ukraine who arrived in 2022 or 2023, as typically a large wave of entries into Israel is followed by a small wave of exits.
Decline in population growth rates in periphery areas and non-Haredi Jewish communities
The study also conducted an in-depth examination of population growth patterns across approximately 1,200 localities in Israel between 2013 and 2022, during which the average annual national growth rate stood at about 1.9% per year.
The data show that, aside from the Golan Heights and the northern part of the Akko subdistrict — which, as of this writing, remains evacuated — population growth in northern Israel has been significantly slower than in other regions. The currently evacuated area in the northern part of the Safed subdistrict even experienced negative growth rates between 2013 and 2022. In the northern part of the Akko subdistrict, more than 40% of the 18 evacuated localities experienced population declines between 2019 and 2022. The remaining localities in the Akko and Safed subdistricts also rank at the bottom of the list, alongside the Kinneret and Jezreel-Nazareth subdistricts. In all these areas, growth rates between 2019 and 2022 stood at less than 1.2% per year — well below the national average. According to the study’s author, these findings reflect issues that predate the current war, and any serious post-war reconstruction plan must take them into account.
Among the 10 subdistricts with the fastest growth rates during 2019–2022, six were located in Judea and Samaria, while two of the remaining four were in the Gaza Envelope area, within the Be’er Sheva and Ashkelon subdistricts. Jerusalem remained, during these years, the subdistrict with the fastest growth rate among those with a large urban core, while growth in Tel Aviv and Ramat Gan remained relatively stable. In other areas in the center of the country, growth rates declined.
When examining growth patterns by population group, it was found that in all Jewish localities, growth patterns were more similar to those of other high-income societies — where cities and towns have long experienced cycles of population inflow and outflow — than to those in Arab society, where no localities experienced negative growth. Growth rates in Haredi localities stood at just 2.8%, significantly lower than the estimated annual growth rate of the Haredi population as a whole (about 3.5%), indicating a substantial increase in the proportion of Haredim living in mixed cities.
An analysis of growth by age group revealed that the fastest-growing group within the general population was the elderly, defined here as those aged 70 and over. In Jewish localities, including Haredi localities, this population grew by about 6% annually, while in Arab localities — despite slightly less variation between sectors — it grew by about 5%. In all other age groups, particularly those under 45, there was much greater variation among population groups. Among those aged 25–34, for example, there were significant differences in average growth rates between predominantly Jewish localities (including Haredi communities) and Arab localities.
Prof. Alex Weinreb, the study’s author, stated: “The events of the past two years in Israel have taken place against a backdrop of consistent and long-term demographic shifts, including increasing disparities in population growth between localities, declining fertility rates, and the first signs of rising emigration. These changes, and the divides they reflect, require strategic long-term planning and responsible policies that will enable Israel to face the many challenges ahead in the post-war period, foremost among them preserving the country’s social and economic resilience.”
The Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel is an independent, non-partisan socioeconomic research institute. The Center provides decision makers and the public with research and findings on some of the most critical issues facing Israel in the areas of education, health, welfare, labor markets and economic policy in order to impact the decision-making process in Israel and to advance the well-being of all Israelis.
For further details or to arrange an interview, please contact Chen Mashiach, the Center Spokesperson: 054-7602151